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1Executive Summary
The best framework for understanding the 
regional politics of the Middle East is as a cold 
war in which Iran and Saudi Arabia play the 
leading roles. These two main actors are not 
confronting each other militarily; rather, their 
contest for influence plays out in the domestic 
political systems of the region’s weak states. It 
is a struggle over the direction of the Middle 
East’s domestic politics more than it is a purely 
military contest. The military and political 
strength of the parties to civil conflicts, and the 
contributions that outsiders can make to that 
strength, is more important than the military 
balance of power between Riyadh and Tehran.
This “new” Middle East cold war shares impor-
tant structural similarities with the 1950s and 
1960s conflicts that Malcolm Kerr famously 
dubbed “the Arab cold war.” The power of the 
major protagonists in the Arab cold war was 
measured in their ability to affect domestic 
political struggles in neighboring states where 
weak regimes had trouble controlling their 
own societies and local players sought regional 
allies against their own domestic opponents. 
Non-state actors played major roles. The 
contending camps themselves were not always 
united, with tactical alliances crossing what 
appeared to be the lines of conflict. The great 
powers were important participants but not 
the drivers of events. The “struggle for Syria” 
was a key element of the Arab cold war. The 
new Middle East cold war shares every one of 
these characteristics.
The current confrontation has an important 
sectarian element, but it cannot be accu-
rately understood simply as a “Sunni versus 
Shia” fight. Applying such a framework can 
distort analytical focus, oversimplify regional 
dynamics, and cause Iran and Saudi Arabia’s 
motives to be misunderstood. Riyadh and 
Tehran are playing a balance of power game. 
They are using sectarianism in that game, but 
both have crossed the sectarian fault line in 
seeking regional allies. The regional cold war 
can only be understood by appreciating the 
links between domestic conflicts, transnational 
affinities, and regional state ambitions. It is the 
weakening of Arab states, more than sectari-
anism or the rise of Islamist ideologies, that has 
created the battlefields of the new Middle East 
cold war. Indeed, it is the arc of state weak-
ness and state failure running from Lebanon 
through Syria to Iraq that explains the current 
salience of sectarianism. Given how difficult it 
will be to reconstruct stable political orders in 
these and other weak states, the likelihood is 
that the new cold war will be as protracted as 
the Arab cold war was.
When the Arab Spring began, Iran had been on 
a winning streak in the Middle East cold war. 
The Saudis were on the defensive, and the Arab 
Spring, especially with the fall of the Mubarak 
regime, seemed to be yet another setback in 
their efforts to confront Iranian influence. This 
is why Syria became so central to Saudi Arabia. 
By the start of 2012, Riyadh was “all in” for 
the rebellion. How the Syrian crisis ends will 
largely determine Middle Eastern perceptions 
of who “won” this round of the contest for 
regional influence.
Axes of conflict in cold wars are never simply 
bilateral, and the same is true of the new 
Middle East cold war. The Saudis, the Muslim 
Brotherhood and its regional allies, al-Qaeda 
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and its affiliates, the emergent Islamic State, and 
other Sunni groups are locked in a conflict over 
what the proper political role of Islam should 
be in the Sunni world. The Arab upheavals of 
2011 were fundamentally about the basis of 
legitimate rule in the Arab world. The com-
bination of democracy and Islamist politics 
represented by the electoral success of Egypt’s 
Muslim Brotherhood and Tunisia’s Ennahda 
was unsettling to the Saudi leadership. Saudi 
tensions with the Muslim Brotherhood did not 
start with the Arab Spring, but the aftermath 
brought that hostility to the surface. The 
inability of Turkey and Saudi Arabia to form 
a powerful axis can also be attributed, in part, 
to an intra-Sunni Islamist dispute over political 
order. Even within the Salafi camp there are 
serious divisions.
A final aspect of the new Middle East cold war 
is the paradox of power. A state’s own military 
power is not a particularly useful tool. Instead, 
the key is to be able to support non-state 
actors effectively in their domestic political 
battles within the weak states of the Arab 
world. Effective patronage of regional allies 
requires transnational ideological and political 
connections that make potential clients open 
to a relationship with the patron. That is why 
Israel and Turkey have not been able to play 
very effectively in the cold war, while Qatar has 
had an outsized influence.
The United States can do little to address 
the weakness of governing institutions in 
many Arab states that has caused the new 
Middle East cold war’s complex of conflicts. 
It therefore needs to take a modest approach 
and recall that this is not America’s war. The 
conflicts have not seriously impaired America’s 
core regional interests. The guiding principle 
of the American response should be to prefer 
order over chaos, and thereby support the 
states that provide effective governance, even 
when that governance does not achieve pre-
ferred levels of democracy and human rights. 
That means, among other things: 1) exploring 
every avenue to a new relationship with the 
Rouhani government in Iran, 2) ensuring 
that the Islamic State’s momentum is reversed 
before pressuring Nouri al-Maliki to be more 
inclusive, 3) continuing to engage with the 
emerging military government in Egypt, and 
4) supporting traditional allies like Jordan, 
Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states. These poli-
cies are certainly “inconsistent” when viewed 
through the lens of the new Middle East cold 
war, but the United States needs to focus on its 
core regional interests as it defines them, not 
as regional powers see them. Concentrating 
American policy on the states that actually 
govern, acting multilaterally, and remembering 
that U.S. interests are not as directly engaged as 
those of the local parties are the keys to riding 
out the new Middle East cold war.
3Introduction
The best framework for understanding the 
complicated and violent regional politics of the 
Middle East is as a cold war among a number 
of regional players, both states and non-state 
actors, in which Iran and Saudi Arabia play 
the leading roles. It is a cold war because these 
two main actors are not confronting and most 
probably will not confront each other militarily. 
Rather, their contest for influence plays out in 
the domestic political systems of the region’s 
weak states. It is a struggle over the direction 
of the Middle East’s domestic politics more 
than a purely military contest. The military 
and political strength of parties to civil wars, 
and the contributions that outsiders can make 
to that strength, is more important than the 
military balance between Riyadh and Tehran. 
This struggle predates the Arab uprisings of 
2011, but that profound regional upheaval has 
opened up new arenas in which the Middle 
East cold war is being played out. There are 
also important conflict axes that fall outside the 
main Saudi-Iranian contest for influence. Saudi 
Arabia also sees itself locked in a contest with 
the Muslim Brotherhood (and to some extent 
Qatar, as a state patron of the Brotherhood) 
over the direction of domestic politics in the 
Sunni Muslim states of the Arab world.
This is a “new” Middle East cold war because it 
shares important structural similarities with the 
Middle East regional conflicts of the 1950s and 
1960s, what the late Malcolm Kerr famously 
dubbed “the Arab cold war.”1 Then, Gamal 
Abd al-Nasir used the new technology of the 
day, transistor radio, to rally Arab nationalist 
support against ruling regimes in Syria, Iraq, 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere. Nasir 
squared off against the “reactionary” monarchs 
in Saudi Arabia and Jordan, but also tangled 
with fellow Arab nationalist “progressives” like 
Abd al-Karim Qasim in Iraq and the Ba‘ath 
Party in Syria. It was not the power of Egypt’s 
army that made Nasir influential. The one time 
he deployed it in service of spreading his influ-
ence in the Arab world, in Yemen, the results 
were disastrous. His military brinksmanship 
with the Israelis in 1967 was even more dam-
aging, in effect ending his regional leadership 
role. It was his ability to mobilize support 
across borders and in the domestic politics of 
other Arab states that made him the leading 
force in Arab politics from the mid-1950s to 
the late 1960s.
The new Middle East cold war goes beyond 
the Arab world.2 Iran is a major protagonist. 
Turkey has made a bid for a greater regional 
role. It is not an ideological battle of “progres-
sives” versus “reactionaries.” The line-ups are 
less ideological and more identity-based. Yet 
the similarities are striking. The power of the 
major protagonists in the Arab cold war was 
measured in their ability to affect domestic 
1 Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971).
2 A number of analysts have asserted that the current upheaval is best understood as taking place within an Arab, rather than a Middle 
Eastern, context, because the core element of the regional upheaval is in being able to define what is legitimate within the context of an Arab 
political identity. See particularly Morten Valbjorn and Andre Bank, “The New Arab Cold War: Rediscovering the Arab Dimension of Mid-
dle East Regional Politics,” Review of International Studies 38, no. 1 (January 2012): 3-24; Curtis Ryan, “The New Arab Cold War and the 
Struggle for Syria,” Middle East Report 42, no. 262 (Spring 2012), <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer262/new-arab-cold-war-struggle-syria>; 
and Nabeel Khoury, “The Arab Cold War Revisited: The Regional Impact of the Arab Uprising,” Middle East Policy 20, no. 2 (Summer 
2013), 73-87.
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political struggles in neighboring states, where 
weak regimes had trouble controlling their 
own societies and local players sought regional 
allies against their domestic opponents. Non-
state actors played major roles. The contending 
camps themselves were not always united, with 
tactical alliances crossing what appeared to 
be the lines of conflict. Israel was a focus, but 
not much of a player. The great powers were 
important participants, but not the drivers of 
events. The new Middle East cold war shares 
every one of these characteristics.3 The current 
confrontation has even come to play a major 
role in the struggle for power in Syria, which 
has drawn in all the regional players, much as 
was the case in the early years of the Arab cold 
war.4 
This new Middle East cold war has an impor-
tant sectarian element, but it cannot be accu-
rately understood simply as a “Sunni versus 
Shia” fight. It is a balance of power game, but 
not one played by impermeable state entities 
with matching military power and occasion-
ally clashing on the battlefield. It can only be 
understood by appreciating the links between 
domestic conflicts, transnational affinities, and 
regional state ambitions.5 Domestic conflicts 
for power lead local actors to seek out regional 
allies who can supply them with money, guns, 
ideological cover, and diplomatic support. 
They look for regional allies who share, in some 
way, their own political and ideological posi-
tions, with whom they feel some kinship on 
ideological or identity grounds. The regional 
powers need these ideological or identity links 
to consolidate their relations with their local 
clients. Providing clients with material support 
is important, but it is not enough to sustain 
influence. States that have the military and 
material potential to reach for regional domi-
nation but lack these ideological and identity 
links across borders, like Israel, are severely 
hampered in their ability to have an impact on 
the new Middle East cold war.
While Nasir’s 1967 defeat marked the end of 
his overwhelming stature in the Arab world, 
the real end of the Arab cold war came with 
the solidifying of Arab state entities. Syria, 
Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the 
Gulf states built governing regimes that were 
oppressive and at times brutal, but were ulti-
mately effective at controlling their societies. 
The decline of the transnational ideological 
power of Arab nationalism coincided with 
the politics of many Arab states becoming 
increasing difficult to penetrate. Important 
outliers like Lebanon and Yemen remained 
weak and open to outside interference in this 
period of Arab state consolidation in the 1970s 
and 1980s, but they were bucking a regional 
trend. Many Arab states are now experiencing 
the weakening, if not the collapse, of those 
state-building projects. It is that weakening of 
the state, more than sectarianism or the rise of 
Islamist ideologies, that has created the battle-
fields of the new Middle East cold war. Given 
how difficult it will be to reconstruct stable 
political orders in these states, the likelihood is 
great that the new Middle East cold war will be 
as protracted as the Arab cold war was.
3 For a similar argument, see Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 
2012), Chapter 2.
4 Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-war Arab Politics, 1945-1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965).
5 Bassel Salloukh reaches a similar conclusion in “The Arab Uprisings and the Geopolitics of the Middle East,” The International Spectator 
48, no. 2 (June 2013): 32-46.
5Understanding the dynamics of the new 
Middle East cold war requires an examination 
of some of the alternative frameworks that have 
been put forward to explain the current phase 
of regional politics. The most common of those 
frameworks is sectarian—that the struggle for 
power in the Middle East today is basically 
a Sunni versus Shia contest. While nuanced 
observers have stressed that other factors are 
involved, the shorthand of “Sunni versus 
Shia” has come to dominate media and even 
policy analysis.6 Watching the killing in Syria, 
Iraq, and Lebanon, one can easily understand 
why. Sectarianism is a major element of the 
domestic conflicts in all of these places as well 
as in Yemen and Bahrain. Regional media out-
lets, from Hizballah’s al-Manar television sta-
tion to Sunni jihadi websites to Saudi-owned 
newspapers and television stations, play up the 
sectarian nature of these struggles. There is no 
denying its important role in understanding 
the current regional conflicts.
An exclusive focus on sectarianism as the cause 
of regional upheaval, however, can distort 
analytical focus. An unstated assumption in the 
sectarianism argument is that these conflicts are 
primordial and thus beyond political solutions, 
but they are not. Sunni and Shia Muslims 
have lived in harmony for many more years of 
Islamic history than they have fought. Conflict 
axes in the recent past of the Middle East did 
not develop along Sunni-Shia lines. The Arab 
cold war was not sectarian, but ideological. The 
Lebanese civil war was a sectarian fight, but 
Christian versus Muslim, with Sunni and Shia 
Lebanese largely on the same side. When Iraq 
fought Iran in the 1980s, Arab supporters of 
Iraq played up the Arab versus Persian nation-
alist fight, while Arab sympathizers with Iran 
(the Syrian regime most notably) emphasized 
the Islamic Republic’s commitment to the Arab 
nationalist cause against Israel. The particu-
larities of current politics, not “centuries-long 
hatreds,” have sparked this latest round of 
Sunni-Shia tensions, and these particularities 
are subject to change.
The sectarian lens also over-simplifies the 
dynamics of regional conflicts. Kurds are an 
important part of both the Syrian and Iraqi 
stories, and their identity is ethno-nationalist, 
not sectarian. Christians in Lebanon are split, 
some supporting the Sunni-led March 14 alli-
ance and others with Hizballah in the March 8 
coalition. The Sunni-Shia shorthand has made 
the Alawis, a heretical offshoot of Shi’ite Islam 
in the eyes of most Shi’ite religious scholars, 
into “Shia” simply to fit into the Sunni versus 
Shia schema.7 What began as a political alliance 
between a secular Ba‘athist regime in Syria and a 
revolutionary Islamic regime in Iran, cemented 
by common enemies in Israel and Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq, has been incorrectly made over 
A  Sectarian Civil  War?
6 See, for example, Geneive Abdo, “The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Sunni-Shi’a Divide,” Analysis Paper 
no. 29, Saban Center at the Brookings Institution, April 2013, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/04/sunni-shia-divide-
abdo>. Abdo’s report is careful and nuanced, but does privilege sectarianism as the most important lens for understanding current regional 
conflicts. A more representative example of the media focus is Max Fisher, “Why Sunnis and Shiites are Fighting, Explained in Two Min-
utes,” Washington Post, 22 January 2014, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/01/22/why-sunnis-and-shias-are-
fighting-explained-in-two-minutes/>.
7 Martin Kramer, “Syria’s Alawis and Shi’ism,” in Shi’ism, Resistance and Revolution (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 237-254.
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into a sectarian alliance.8 Iraqi Prime Minister 
Nuri al-Maliki has almost as many problems 
dealing with the Shia allies in his coalition as 
he does with Sunni and Kurdish factions in the 
Iraqi parliament.9 “Sunni versus Shia” makes 
for a simple headline, but does not do justice to 
the complexities of the new Middle East cold 
war.
Perhaps the most dangerous oversimplification 
to come from an un-nuanced acceptance of the 
“Sunni versus Shia” frame is to misunderstand 
the motivations of the two major state actors 
in the regional contest for influence. It is very 
easy to paint Saudi Arabia and Iran as sectarian 
actors, acting regionally with sectarian motives. 
Both are obviously sec-
tarian regimes at home, 
propounding very specific 
Sunni-Wahhabi (in the 
Saudi case) and Shia (in 
the Iranian case) legiti-
macy arguments to bolster 
their rule. It is therefore a 
simple analytical step to 
assume that sectarianism 
drives their foreign policies, but that step is 
incorrect. Riyadh and Tehran are playing a 
balance of power game. They are using sec-
tarianism in that game, yet their motivations 
are not centuries-long religious disputes but a 
simple contest for regional influence. Neither 
side publicly asserts that they are engaged in 
a sectarian fight—in fact, each blames the 
other for introducing sectarian divisiveness 
into regional politics. That neither will admit 
to sectarian motives, even while using sec-
tarianism to build patron-client relations, gives 
some indication of what they think regional 
audiences do and do not want to hear.
Both Riyadh and Tehran have also crossed 
the sectarian fault line in seeking regional 
allies. This is more important for the Iranians, 
as a purely sectarian frame locks them into a 
minority position in most countries. Among 
Palestinian organizations, they have devel-
oped close relationships with Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad (though ties with the former 
have been strained over the Syrian civil war) 
and positioned themselves to lead the “axis of 
resistance” against Israel.10 They have a good 
working relationship with some of the Kurdish 
organizations in Iraq’s Kurdish Regional 
Government, particularly the Patriotic Union 
of Kurdistan. Since Iran’s revolution, Tehran 
has publicly downplayed the particular Shi’ite 
nature of its version of Islamist revolutionary 
politics, emphasizing the ecumenical Muslim 
nature of its model, while still having its 
greatest success in developing allies and clients 
among Arab Shia.
The Saudis, while exploiting sectarianism in 
Syria where there is a Sunni majority, have 
also not limited their alliances simply to fellow 
Sunnis, nor adopted every Sunni group as an 
ally. Riyadh strongly backed the Iraqiya party 
led by Iyad Allawi in the Iraqi elections of 2005 
and 2010.11 Allawi is a thoroughly secular poli-
tician, but a Shi’ite by birth, and his coalition 
included an ethnic and sectarian cross-section 
of Iraq. While it might have been weighted 
toward the Sunni Arab minority, it was not 
a Sunni sectarian party. Such parties existed 
in Iraq, and there is no evidence that they 
received similar support from Saudi Arabia. In 
Syria, the Saudis originally patronized the least 
sectarian of the rebel groups, the Free Syrian 
Army (FSA), and other groups that kept their 
distance from the Muslim Brotherhood.12 After 
8 On the historical background of the Syrian-Iranian alliance, see Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Mid-
dle Powers in a Penetrated System (London: Routledge, 1997); Hussein Agha and Ahmad Khalidi, Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation 
(London: Pinter Publishers for the Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1995).
9 Harith Hasan, “New Shia Politics and the Maliki-Sadr Competition in Iraq,” MENASource, Atlantic Council, 17 November 2013, 
<http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/new-shia-politics-and-the-maliki-sadr-competition-in-iraq>.
10 Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 61-69, 
171-73.
11 Michael Gordon, “Meddling Neighbors Undercut Iraqi Stability,” The New York Times, 5 December 2010; Toby Dodge, Iraq: From War 
to a New Authoritarianism (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012), 192.
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7deciding that the FSA was not producing the 
desired results, the Saudis shifted some of their 
backing to more overtly sectarian Salafi fighting 
groups, supporting the formation of the 
Islamic Front in 2013, but still refusing to back 
Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq 
and al-Sham (ISIS), the Sunni fighting groups 
publicly linked to al-Qaeda.13 Sectarianism was 
never the sole basis upon which Saudi Arabia 
approached the Syrian civil war. Finally, a 
purely sectarian frame cannot explain Saudi 
hostility toward the Muslim Brotherhood, 
an important element of post-Arab Spring 
regional politics. If sectarianism dominates 
Saudi policy-making, the Brotherhood should 
be seen by Riyadh as an ally, but this is hardly 
the case in Egypt, Iraq, or Syria.
12 Martin Chulov, Ewen MacAskill and John Densky, “Saudi Arabia plans to fund Syria rebel army,” The Guardian, 22 June 2012, <www.
guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/22/saudi-arabia-syria-rebel-army>; Roula Khalaf, “Arms Deliveries to Syrian Rebels Delayed,” Finan-
cial Times, 11 July 2012, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/36d84430-cb5f-11e1-b896-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2xlJMaFNy>; Robert F. 
Worth, “Citing U.S. Fears, Arab Allies Limit Syrian Rebel Aid,” The New York Times, 6 October 2012; Ruth Sherlock, Magdy Samaan 
and Suha Maayeh, “Saudi Arabia backs push to carve out liberated southern Syria,” The Telegraph, 5 April 2013, <http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9975211/Saudi-Arabia-backs-push-to-carve-out-liberated-southern-Syria.html>; Rania Abouzeid, 
“The Shadow War Behind Syria’s Rebellion: Foreign Backers Jockey for Influence in Turkey,” Time, 24 May 2013, <http://world.time.
com/2013/05/24/the-shadow-war-behind-syrias-rebellion-foreign-backers-jockey-for-influence-in-turkey/>; Adam Entous, Nour Malas 
and Margaret Coker, “A Veteran Saudi Power Player Works to Build Support to Topple Assad,” Wall Street Journal, 25 August 2013, <http://
online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323423804579024452583045962>.
13 Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Saudi Arabia Boosts Salafist Rivals to al-Qaeda in Syria,” Reuters, 1 October 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/10/01/us-syria-crisis-jihadists-insight-idUSBRE9900RO20131001>; Yezid Sayigh, “Unifying Syria’s Rebels: Saudi Arabia 
Joins the Fray,” Carnegie Middle East Center, 28 October 2013, <http://carnegie-mec.org/2013/10/28/unifying-syria-s-rebels-saudi-arabia-
joins-fray/greh>; Ben Gilbert, “Saudi Arabia Walks a Fine Line in Backing Syrian Rebellion,” Al Jazeera America, 20 January 2014, <http://
america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/1/20/saudi-arabia-walksafinelinkinbackingsyriarebellion.html>.
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Rather than seeing the new Middle East cold 
war as a top-down phenomenon driven by two 
states animated by sectarian rivalry, it is more 
accurate to view it as a bottom-up dynamic. 
The weakness or breakdown of state authority 
creates domestic political vacuums into which 
outsiders are drawn. These outsiders generally 
do not have to force themselves into these 
domestic political arenas. They are invited 
in by local political factions vying for power 
against their local rivals. The object of the cold 
war rivalry for Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other 
regional powers is not to defeat their regional 
rivals militarily on the battlefield. It is to pro-
mote the fortunes of their own clients in these 
weak state domestic struggles and thus build up 
regional influence. 
It is important to distinguish between state 
weakness in the domestic political arena and 
weakness in international power rankings. A 
domestically weak state is one where the cen-
tral government exercises little effective control 
over its society. It cannot enforce its writ in 
substantial parts of its territory. Its courts 
cannot enforce decisions, it cannot provide 
basic services to its citizens, and it does not 
control its borders. Sub-national groups have 
the military power to challenge the weak state’s 
control of territory, so the domestically weak 
state does not even pass the basic Weberian test 
of statehood—a monopoly on the legitimate 
use of force within its borders. In domestically 
weak states, citizens frequently have political 
loyalties that supersede their loyalty to the state 
itself, be they regional, sectarian, sub-national, 
or transnational.14 Kuwait is a weak state in 
terms of international power; it cannot defend 
itself militarily against any of its neighbors. 
Yet it is a fairly strong state in terms of its own 
state-society relations. The Kuwaiti government 
effectively controls its territory and polices its 
borders. Its citizens are generally loyal to the 
Kuwaiti state; their identity as Kuwaitis is not 
trumped by tribal, sectarian, or Arab nationalist 
affiliations. Those other identities are impor-
tant in understanding how Kuwaitis behave 
politically, but they do not supersede Kuwaiti 
identity as the primary political loyalty of the 
citizens. Iraq ranks much higher than Kuwait 
in international power rankings due to the size 
of its population, economy, and military, but 
it is now a weak state in terms of state-society 
relations. 
The seriousness of a regional cold war is deter-
mined by the number of such domestically 
weak states that exist at a given time. During the 
Arab cold war of the 1950s and 1960s, very few 
of the Arab states could be considered strong 
in terms of state-society relations. Loyalty to 
the state was challenged by sub-national and 
supra-national identities, most notably by Arab 
nationalism. The states themselves were institu-
tionally weak, without the large and stultifying 
bureaucratic apparatuses they eventually built 
to control, monitor, and direct their societies 
and economies. Nasir was able to mobilize 
The Domestic Bases  of the New 
Middle East Cold War
14 There is extensive literature on the relative strength and weakness of states in terms of their ability to govern their societies and the 
related topic of state-building. See Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Moham-
med Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State-Making, Regional Conflict and the International System (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
1995); Susan E. Rice and Stewart Patrick, “Index of State Weakness in the Developing World,” The Brookings Institution, 2008, <http://
www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2008/2/weak%20states%20index/02_weak_states_index.pdf>. 
9support in many of these states, shake their 
governments, and even help to bring down 
regimes in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. 
Conversely, in the aftermath of the Iranian 
Revolution, when the salience of revolutionary 
political Islam was at its height and the new 
Islamic Republic regime was actively encour-
aging the “export” of the revolution, not a 
single Arab government fell, though many 
faced serious crises and upheaval. This was 
not because the message of Islamist revolution 
did not resonate in the region. The success of 
Islamist political groups of various stripes since 
that time belies that contention. Rather, the 
ability of the Arab regimes to blunt the ripple 
effects of Iran’s Islamic revolution stemmed 
from the fact that they had built themselves 
into stronger institutional entities that were 
better able to coopt, control, and repress their 
populations. Oil wealth helped, but even non-
oil states like Syria and Jordan had been able 
to strengthen state control over society. This 
process was not peaceful or entirely positive 
for the citizens—state-building never is. It 
involved civil conflict and even civil war in 
some places, the growth of the secret police and 
a concomitant loss of political freedom, and 
the corruption and economic stagnation that 
comes from an overweening state. Nonetheless, 
it enabled the Arab regimes to survive the shock 
of the Iranian revolution.
Iran’s biggest initial success in “exporting” its 
revolution occurred in Lebanon with the cre-
ation of Hizballah in the aftermath of the Israeli 
invasion of 1982. Lebanon was an exception to 
the process of state-building that absorbed its 
Arab neighbors in the 1970s and 1980s, and 
its political history has been marked by foreign 
intervention. Israel and Syria both intervened 
militarily, especially during Lebanon’s 1975-
1990 civil war, occupying substantial swathes 
of Lebanese territory for some time. Other 
powers intervened indirectly, supporting 
various Lebanese factions. Iran was most suc-
cessful on this score, helping to build its ally 
Hizballah into the most important actor in the 
country, but Saudi Arabia and even Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq patronized their own clients in 
Lebanese politics. Every Lebanese faction looks 
to foreign powers for financial, military, and 
diplomatic support. Given the overtly sectarian 
basis of the Lebanese political system, those 
factions were inevitably sectarian. Yemen is 
another example of an Arab state that never 
developed a strong central authority. After the 
unity between North and 
South Yemen in 1990, 
the patrimonial and ad 
hoc rule of Ali Abdullah 
Saleh in the north was 
extended into the south, 
with the centrifugal pres-
sures that resulted still 
affecting Yemeni politics 
today. In this case, it is 
Saudi Arabia that has most effectively devel-
oped relations with the tribal sheikhs, Islamist 
leaders, regional factions, and ambitious 
politicians.15
As long as these areas of state weakness remained 
few and somewhat marginal to the strategic 
centers of regional politics, state-to-state rela-
tions dominated the international politics of 
the Middle East. From the 1970s through the 
early 2000s, inter-state war and peace drove 
regional dynamics. The October 1973 war led 
to Egyptian-Israeli peace, followed by the Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon, which pushed a major 
non-state Arab actor, the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO), all the way to Tunis. Iran 
and Iraq fought their eight-year war, followed 
by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War 
of 1990-91 that restored Kuwaiti sovereignty. 
That war was followed by a new round of 
Arab-Israeli negotiations, leading to Jordanian-
Israeli peace in 1994 and the most serious 
Syrian-Israeli and PLO-Israeli negotiations in 
15 For an overview of Yemen’s turbulent post-unity politics, see Stephen W. Day, Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National 
Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
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history in the late 1990s. An important (at least 
in retrospect) Arab non-state actor, al-Qaeda, 
had to find a base far from the Arab world, in 
Afghanistan, from which to plan the September 
11, 2001 attacks on the United States.
The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 shifted this 
pattern, starting the reversal of Arab state 
strengthening that had begun in the 1970s. 
The capacity of the Iraqi state had eroded 
severely after the Gulf War, but the American 
invasion was the coup de grace. Washington 
chose to tear down the authoritarian state’s 
three major pillars—banning the ruling Ba’ath 
party, dissolving the military, and purging the 
bureaucracy of experienced cadres who were 
members of the party—in a misbegotten effort 
to build the state anew.16 What followed was an 
opening of the Iraqi political system to outside 
political influence, most 
notably from Iran. Iraq, 
which for decades had 
been a player in regional 
politics, joined Lebanon 
and Yemen as a battle-
ground in Arab politics. 
This was the real begin-
ning of the new Middle 
East cold war. 
The breaking of the Iraqi state enormously 
increased the salience of sectarianism in 
regional politics, from the bottom-up. Sectarian 
and ethnic identities had been important in 
Iraqi politics since the days of the Hashemite 
monarchy, but when the state was strong, their 
importance was mitigated by other identities 
and loyalties, including to the state itself, and 
kept in check by state institutions. The weak-
ening of the Iraqi state under sanctions in the 
1990s led Hussein to increase his reliance on 
sectarian Sunni and tribal loyalty to buttress his 
failing rule.17 With the collapse of the state in 
2003, sectarian and ethnic Kurdish identities 
became primary in the fight for power. Shia 
parties looked to Iran for support; Sunnis simi-
larly looked to Saudi Arabia.18 The sectarian 
character of the new Middle East cold war was 
set. 
When Syria eventually descended into civil 
conflict during the Arab uprisings of 2011, the 
sectarian element of the new Middle East cold 
war intensified. The protests that began the 
Syrian crisis were peaceful and broadly based, 
calling for political reform. The violent over-
reaction of the Bashar al-Assad regime to these 
protests drove the country into civil war. As that 
conflict intensified and Syrian state authority 
collapsed in various parts of the country, the 
regime came to rely more and more on its 
bedrock constituency, the Alawi minority, and 
other religious minorities fearful of change. 
In a mirror image, the opposition increas-
ingly became characterized by Sunni sectarian 
appeals, and armed Sunni Islamist groups 
played an increasing role in the conflict.19
An arc of state weakness and state failure, 
running from Lebanon through Syria to Iraq, 
explains the salience of sectarianism in the 
new Middle East cold war.20 The retreat of the 
state, accompanied particularly in Syria by the 
violence exercised by those who controlled 
the state, drove people in these countries to 
look to sectarian identities and groups for the 
protection and material sustenance that the 
state either could or would no longer provide. 
These groups looked to external allies for sup-
port in their domestic political and military 
conflicts. As sectarianism increasingly defined 
their struggles, it was natural that they look to 
co-religionists—Iran for Shia and Saudi Arabia 
for Sunnis—for that support. The retreat of the 
state made it possible for Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
and other regional states to play an increasing 
“The breaking 
of the Iraqi state 
enormously 
increased the 
salience of 
sectarianism in 
regional politics.”
16 F. Gregory Gause, III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 155-168.
17 Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 2nd ed., (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004), Chapter 10.
18 Dodge, Iraq: War to Authoritarianism, Chapters 1 and 6.
19 Emile Hokayem, Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2013).
20 Daniel Byman, “Sectarianism Afflicts the New Middle East,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 56, no. 1 (February/March 2014): 79-100.
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role in the civil conflicts of Lebanon (for some 
time), Iraq (since 2003), and Syria (since 2011). 
This is the core, bottom-up dynamic driving 
the new Middle East cold war. Saudi Arabia 
and Iran did not create the state weakness and 
sectarian identities in these countries, but they 
are certainly taking advantage, advancing their 
own interests in a classic balance of power 
game.
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The new Middle East cold war predates 
the Arab Spring by at least half a decade, 
but increased Iranian influence in the Arab 
world dates back even longer. The Iranian 
revolutionary regime was keen to spread its 
revolutionary model in the Arab world, but 
was stymied by the relatively strong states. The 
establishment of Hizballah, which remains its 
strongest non-state ally, was described above. 
In a very different manner, Tehran established 
a strong state-to-state alliance with Ba’athist 
Syria. This alliance was based not on common 
values—the secular, Arab nationalist regime 
of Hafez al-Assad could not have been to 
the liking of Ayatallah Khomeini—but on 
common enemies, Israel and Saddam Hussein’s 
Iraq. In general, however, Khomeini’s dream of 
spreading the Islamic revolution throughout 
the Muslim world, beginning in the Middle 
East, failed.21
Iranian diplomacy lost much of its revolu-
tionary élan after the death of Khomeini. 
Tehran continued to excoriate the United 
States and Israel on ideological grounds, but 
from the late 1980s through the early 2000s 
it engaged in more normal state-to-state diplo-
macy. Elements of the regime never abandoned 
the rhetoric of, nor the desire for, “export of 
the revolution,” but Iran sought improved 
relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) states (a process accelerated on both 
sides by Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990), 
Turkey, and Egypt. In part, this was because 
the opportunities for ideological advances were 
limited. Saddam still held tightly to the rump 
of Iraq he controlled. The Taliban regime to 
the east of Iran was extremely hostile. The Gulf 
states with significant Shi’ite communities were 
able to fend off efforts at political penetration 
through oil-driven state building—providing 
benefits for Shi’ite citizens and developing 
security services that effectively monitored 
and controlled the populations. Iran’s regional 
moderation was at least in part the result of a 
lack of opportunities to spread its influence.22
New opportunities presented themselves in the 
2000s. The American invasions of Afghanistan 
and Iraq opened up the political arena in two 
of Iran’s neighbors, one of which had a majority 
Shi’ite population. United States policy created 
two new political vacuums into which Iranian 
influence could flow. The election of Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad as president of Iran in 2005 
brought to power that ever-present faction that 
is more committed to the revolutionary rhet-
oric of Ayatollah Khomeini and to spreading 
Iranian influence to the domestic politics of 
other states. These renewed ambitions and new 
opportunities in Iraq propelled Iran into a new 
position of power in the eastern Arab world. By 
the mid-2000s, Iran was a leading, if not the 
leading, foreign influence in Lebanon, Syria, 
and Iraq.23
As the consequences of the American inva-
sion of Iraq became apparent, particularly the 
increase in Iranian influence in Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia gradually concluded that it would have 
to take the lead in balancing, if not rolling 
back, Iranian power in the eastern Arab world. 
21 Gause, International Relations of the Persian Gulf, Chapters 3-5; Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, Chapters 5, 6, 9, 11.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
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It is uncharacteristic of Riyadh to take the 
lead in regional foreign affairs, particularly 
in a confrontational way. Weak militarily, 
the Saudis have preferred to work behind 
the scenes, avoiding direct challenges that 
might lead to conflict. State-to-state relations 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran during the 
presidencies of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani 
and Muhammad Khatami were hardly warm, 
but neither were they openly hostile. Even after 
the election of Iranian president Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad in 2005, who moved away from 
the more conciliatory rhetoric of his immediate 
predecessors, the Saudis made a few efforts to 
find some kind of regional modus vivendi with 
Tehran. The two states even worked together 
to try to resolve tensions among their clients in 
Lebanon in early 2007.24 As late as March 2007 
the Saudis hosted Ahmadinejad in Riyadh. 
Clearly, however, somewhere in the mid-to-late 
2000s, Riyadh decided that no other Arab state 
was willing or able to act as a counterweight to 
growing Iranian influence in the eastern Arab 
world and that it would have to do the job 
itself.
The problem for the Saudis was that the Iranians 
got the better of them at almost every turn. In 
Lebanon, it looked like Riyadh dealt Tehran a 
setback in 2005 with the withdrawal of Syria’s 
forces and the victory of the March 14 coali-
tion in the subsequent parliamentary elections. 
March 14 was led by Saad al-Hariri, son of the 
assassinated former prime minister and close 
Saudi ally Rafiq al-Hariri. Before long, how-
ever, Hizballah proved that it was still the real 
power in Lebanese politics. It demonstrated its 
utter disregard for the Lebanese government in 
its independent conduct of foreign and military 
policy during its brief war with Israel in 2006. 
In 2008, during a confrontation with the 
government over control of domestic security 
policy, Hizballah fighters took over downtown 
Beirut. Despite March 14’s second victory at 
the polls in the 2009 parliamentary elections, 
Saudi Arabia’s Lebanese allies were unable to 
subdue Hizballah. By the beginning of 2011, 
March 14 had lost its parliamentary majority 
as some of its elements joined with Hizballah 
and its allies to unseat Saad al-Hariri from the 
premiership.25 
The Saudis also failed to constrain Iranian influ-
ence in Iraq. As Iran consolidated its influence 
with newly empowered Shi’ite groups, Saudi 
Arabia was unable to patronize its natural allies 
in Iraq’s Sunni Arab community. Members of 
this community were engaged in an insurgency 
against the United States, whose relations with 
Saudi Arabia were fragile in the post-9/11 
period, and part of that insurgency was identified 
with the same strain of Salafi jihadism that was 
trying to destabilize the Saudi regime. (Riyadh 
finds itself in the same situation regarding the 
gains made by ISIS in the summer of 2014.) 
When the al-Sahwa (Awakening) movement 
emerged in 2006, Saudi Arabia found an Iraqi 
ally with which it could do business—Sunni, 
hostile to Iranian influence in Iraq, but 
cooperating with the United States-Riyadh 
backed al-Sahwa. While the movement was 
able to push back (at least temporarily) against 
al-Qaeda influence in Iraq’s Sunni Arab com-
munity, it could do little to affect politics at its 
center. To challenge the demographic weight of 
Iraq’s Shi’ite majority at the ballot box, Riyadh 
backed the Iraqiya party 
led by Iyad Allawi, who 
had served as prime 
minister of the transi-
tional Iraqi government 
of 2004-05. Allawi is 
Shi‘ite, but constructed 
his party as a cross-
sectarian and multi-
ethnic coalition based on Iraqi nationalism. 
While the party did not do well in the 2005 
elections, discontent with Prime Minister Nuri 
24 Michael Slackman, “U.S. Ally and Foe are Trying to Avert War in Lebanon,” The New York Times, 30 January 2007, < http://www.nytimes.
com/2007/01/30/world/middleeast/30lebanon.html?pagewanted=print 
25 Anthony Shadid, “Ousted Lebanese Leader Swallows Rivals’ Bitter Pill,” The New York Times, 25 January 2011, <http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/01/26/world/middleeast/26lebanon.html>.
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al-Maliki gave Allawi an opening in the 2010 
parliamentary elections. The Saudis supported 
him financially and through Saudi-owned Arab 
media outlets.26 The Iraqiya party succeeded 
in getting a plurality of the seats, besting 
Maliki’s State of Law coalition by two seats, but 
Maliki was able, with Iranian support, to hold 
together the sectarian Shia parties and retain 
the premiership.27 The Saudis were reduced to 
purely symbolic, and arguably counterproduc-
tive, gestures like refusing to receive Maliki in 
Riyadh for official visits and refusing to send an 
ambassador to Baghdad.
While Palestine is not riven by sectarian dif-
ferences, it is another example of a weak state 
(or, more accurately, proto-state) in which 
outsiders find it easy to meddle. With the 
victory of Hamas in the 2006 Palestinian par-
liamentary elections, the Palestinian Authority 
has seen power divided between Fatah, rep-
resented by Palestinian President Mahmoud 
Abbas, and Hamas. Both looked to outsiders 
for support, with Hamas seeing in Iran an 
ideological—though not sectarian—ally. In 
an effort to reunite Palestinian ranks and 
close off an access point for Iran in the Arab 
world, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia brought 
Hamas and Fatah leaders together in Mecca in 
February 2007. The power-sharing agreement 
he brokered fell apart almost immediately. In 
the subsequent fighting in June 2007, Hamas 
secured control over Gaza while Fatah main-
tained its sway in the West Bank.28 With the 
two Palestinian factions in open confrontation, 
Hamas’ relationship with Iran grew stronger, 
though the upsurge in regional sectarianism 
since the Syrian civil war began has strained 
that tie. Saudi Arabia patronized the Palestinian 
Authority in the West Bank to keep its hand in 
the game of Palestinian politics, but failed to 
close off Iranian access to this core Arab and 
Muslim symbolic issue.
These failures of Saudi foreign policy can help 
explain the disproportionate Saudi reaction, 
and the large amount of publicity they gave, to 
the rise of the Houthi movement in northern 
Yemen. The Houthis are a Zaidi Shi‘ite move-
ment that developed in the early 2000s to 
assert Zaidi rights amidst what they saw as 
the increased role of Salafi Sunnis in Yemen. 
The Houthis adopted much of the rhetoric of 
the Iranian regime, including bombastic anti-
American and anti-Israeli language, though the 
extent of Iranian support for the movement 
seems to have been very limited.29 In November 
2009, Riyadh launched a major military opera-
tion along the Saudi-Yemeni border to punish 
the Houthis for what the Saudis claimed 
were encroachments into Saudi territory. The 
campaign received extensive coverage in the 
Saudi media, far beyond its accomplishments. 
The Saudi claim to “victory” in Yemen over an 
Iranian ally in 2009 can be seen as an effort to 
convince regional audiences that Riyadh could 
win one against Tehran in the regional contest 
for influence.30
When the Arab Spring began, Iran had been on 
a winning streak in the Middle East cold war 
and was looking for more victories. The swift 
fall of (somewhat) secularist, American-allied 
regimes in Tunisia and Egypt contributed to 
a triumphalist attitude in Tehran. The gov-
ernment portrayed these events as part of an 
Islamic, not an Arab, movement that began 
with Iran’s own revolution in 1979. In early 
26 Michael R. Gordon, “Meddling Neighbors Undercut Iraqi Stability,” The New York Times, 5 December 2010, <http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/12/06/world/middleeast/06wikileaks-iraq.html>.
27 Ned Parker, “Dozens of Iraqis pardoned at Sadr movement’s behest,” Los Angeles Times, 27 July 2011, <www.latimes.com/news/
nationworld/world/la-fg-iraq-pardons-20110727,0,3363151.story>; Dodge, Iraq: War to Authoritarianism, 186-88.
28 International Crisis Group, “After Gaza,” Middle East Report no. 68, 2 August 2007, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/
Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Israel%20Palestine/68_after_gaza.pdf>.
29 International Crisis Group, “Yemen: Defusing the Saada Timebomb,” Middle East Report no. 86, 27 May 2009, 2-4, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/
en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/yemen/086-yemen-defusing-the-saada-time-bomb.aspx>.
30 Daud al-Shiryan, “Ad‘af al-’iman - al-Yemen fi Muwajihat Iran” [The least one could do – Yemen in confrontation with Iran], Mareb Press, 19 August 
2009, <http://marebpress.net/articles.php?lng=arabic&id=5731>; Thom Shanker and Robert F. Worth, “Yemen Seizes Sailboat Filled with Weapons, 
and U.S. Points to Iran,” The New York Times, 28 January 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/world/middleeast/29military.html>.
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February 2012, it invited numerous Arab 
delegations (but none from Syria) to a confer-
ence to celebrate what it called the “Islamist 
Awakening.”31 The Saudis, on the other hand, 
were on the defensive. The fall of the Mubarak 
regime in Egypt was a serious blow to Saudi 
regional policy. Cairo had been Riyadh’s most 
important regional partner—a fellow American 
ally that shared Saudi worries about the spread 
of Iranian influence. The Saudis bolstered 
fellow monarchs with cash and, in the case of 
Bahrain, troops to support the suppression of 
the popular mobilization for political reform. 
They supported the NATO military interven-
tion against Qaddafi, but that was more per-
sonal payback for decades of insults from the 
mercurial Libyan leader and a Libyan-financed 
effort to assassinate King Abdallah than regional 
strategy. They were able to reassert their central 
role in Yemeni politics, brokering the resigna-
tion of Ali Abdullah Saleh from the presidency 
as part of a GCC plan supported by the United 
States and the EU.32 Bahrain and Yemen were 
merely holding actions, though, and the fall of 
Qaddafi did not really shift the regional power 
game. None of these marginal successes could 
make up for the loss of Egypt in Saudi regional 
strategy. In general, the Arab Spring seemed to 
the Saudis to be yet another setback in their 
efforts to confront Iranian influence in the 
eastern Arab world. 
This is why Syria became so central to Saudi 
Arabia. The Syrian revolt against Bashar al-
Assad was the one opportunity presented by 
the upheavals of the Arab Spring for Riyadh 
to roll back Iranian influence. The Saudis were 
slow to react to events in Syria, their natural 
aversion to political mobilization from below 
inducing caution. Moreover, Turkey’s and 
Qatar’s quick embrace of the Syrian opposition 
left the Saudis behind the curve and reluctant 
to play second fiddle, especially to their ambi-
tious Gulf neighbor (see below). By the start 
of 2012, though, Riyadh was “all in” for the 
Syrian rebellion. It initially supported the 
more secular forces of the FSA, while Turkey 
and Qatar backed Islamist groups in the north 
of the country. As the inability of the FSA to 
make much military progress became apparent 
and Turkey and Qatar backed away from their 
initial support for the opposition, the Saudis 
refocused support toward Islamist, and particu-
larly Salafi, opposition groups, other than ISIS 
and al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra.33
As of mid-2014, what has become an integrated 
Syria-Iraq crisis remains the major battleground 
of the new Middle East cold war. Iranian influ-
ence in Lebanon seems secure, and Tehran 
seems to hold the upper hand in both Syria and 
Iraq. Bashar al-Assad looks more secure than he 
was just a year ago. The ISIS-led assault in Iraq 
has little prospect of success outside of Sunni 
areas and gains by ISIS—now known as the 
Islamic State—are hardly victories for Saudi 
Arabia. The Saudis have successfully bolstered 
their fellow Arab monarchs and ratified their 
leading position in Yemen. How the Syrian-
Iraqi crisis ends will largely determine Middle 
Eastern perceptions of who “won” this round 
of the contest for regional influence.
31 Robert F. Worth, “Effort to Rebrand Arab Spring Backfires in Iran,” The New York Times, 2 February 2012, <http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/02/03/world/middleeast/effort-to-rebrand-arab-spring-backfires-in-iran.html>.
32 International Crisis Group, “Yemen: Enduring Conflicts, Threatened Transition,” Middle East Report no. 125, 3 July 2012, <http://www.
crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Yemen/125-yemen-enduring-conflicts-threatened-
transition.pdf>, 1-3.
33 Chulov, MacAskill, and Densky, “Saudi Arabia plans”; Khalaf, “Arms Deliveries Delayed”; Worth, “Arab Allies Limit Aid”; Sherlock, Sa-
maan and Maayeh, “Saudi Arabia backs push”; Abouzeid, “Shadow War”; Entous, Malas and Coker, “Veteran Saudi Power Player”; Oweis, 
“Saudi Arabia Boosts Salafist”; Sayigh, “Unifying Syria’s Rebels”; Gilbert, “Saudi Arabia Walks a Fine Line.”
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Axes of conflict in cold wars are never simply 
bilateral. There are always tangents of tension 
among what one would think of as “natural” 
allies. China broke from the Soviet camp during 
the historic Cold War over geopolitical and ide-
ological differences. During the Arab cold war 
of the 1950s and 1960s, the “progressive” Iraqi 
regime of Abd al-Karim Qasim refused to follow 
Abd al-Nasir’s lead. The Syrian Ba‘ath helped to 
break up the United Arab Republic in 1961. 
The same is true of the new Middle East cold 
war. One might assume that Sunni Islamists 
of various stripes would make common cause 
in the regional upheavals of the last few years, 
but the opposite has been the case. The Saudis, 
the Muslim Brotherhood and its regional allies 
like the Justice and Development party (AKP) 
government in Turkey, the Salafi jihadists of 
al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and its ideological coun-
terparts like the Islamic State, and other Sunni 
groups are locked in a conflict over what the 
proper political role of Islam should be in the 
Sunni world.
From a purely sectarian frame, the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia should have 
been close allies against Shi‘ite Iran. In fact, 
the Saudis were the biggest cheerleaders (and 
funders) of the military coup that ousted the 
elected Brotherhood president of Egypt. While 
Saudi Arabia and Turkey both backed the 
Syrian revolt, there is no evidence that they 
coordinated their support. The two major 
Sunni powers in the Middle East cold war are 
hardly allies. While Saudi Arabia increasingly 
supported Salafi groups in Syria as the civil war 
there dragged on, it still sought to differentiate 
the “good” Salafi groups from those aligned 
with al-Qaeda, which sees the Saudi regime 
as one of its major enemies—a difficult task 
at best.34 While increasing its support for the 
Syrian rebellion, in early 2014 Riyadh declared 
it illegal for Saudis to join the fighting there 
or in other foreign countries, reacting to the 
number of Saudis who were joining al-Qaeda-
linked groups in the Syrian war.35 In March 
2014, Saudi Arabia officially designated the 
Muslim Brotherhood, al-Qaeda and its affili-
ates, and ISIS as terrorist organizations.36 In 
this supposedly sectarian regional conflict, the 
Sunnis seem to distrust each other as much as 
they distrust the Shia.
The Arab upheavals of 2011 were fundamen-
tally about the basis of legitimate rule in the 
Arab world. In some cases, like Syria and 
Bahrain, that original issue was transformed by 
regime strategies and violence into a sectarian 
clash. Elsewhere in the Arab world, however, 
where the social fabric was not as riven by 
competing identities and the state did not 
completely collapse, that core constitutional 
question remained at the heart of political con-
tests. Egypt is the perfect example. The results 
of the parliamentary election of 2011, where 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice 
34 “The commander of an Islamist rebel unit … told Reuters that Saudi figures had been in touch with various Salafist groups in recent weeks, 
offering support in return for a common front to keep al Qaeda allies from expanding their presence around the capital.” Khaled Yacoub 
Oweis, “Saudi Arabia Boosts Salafist.”
35 Angus McDowell and Yara Bayoumy, “Saudi Arabia to jail citizens who fight abroad,” Reuters, 3 February 2014, <http://www.reuters.
com/article/2014/02/03/us-saudi-law-idUSBREA1213O20140203>.
36 David D. Kirkpatrick, “Saudis Put Terrorist Label on Muslim Brotherhood,” New York Times, 7 March 2014, <http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/03/08/world/middleeast/saudis-put-terrorist-label-on-muslim-brotherhood.html>.
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Party and the Salafi Nour Party took nearly 
70% of the seats between them, and the presi-
dential election of 2012, where Brotherhood 
candidate Muhammad Morsi won a very close 
race against Mubarak’s last prime minister, 
seemed to chart a path of democratic Islamist 
government. The Brotherhood equivalent in 
Tunisia, Ennahda, did not win such a crushing 
victory in the 2011 constituent assembly elec-
tions, but emerged with a clear plurality of the 
votes. 
This combination of democracy and Islamist 
politics was unsettling to the Saudi leadership. 
The upheaval in Egypt had not only removed 
Saudi Arabia’s primary Arab ally, it also brought 
to power a regime that could credibly contest 
Saudi Arabia’s role as leader of the Sunni Muslim 
world, and even present an alternative form of 
Sunni Islamist politics to the Saudi monar-
chical model. Anti-Brotherhood sentiments 
are not limited to the Saudi government. The 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been particu-
larly harsh on the Brotherhood, imprisoning 
its members and sympathizers and closing 
down related institutions.37 To add insult to 
injury for the Saudis, their obstreperous Gulf 
neighbor, Qatar, was very publicly supporting 
the Brotherhood government in Egypt and was 
backing the Brotherhood’s cause more generally 
throughout the region.38 Perhaps even more 
challenging for the Saudis in the long run, the 
swiftness with which Egypt’s Salafis entered the 
electoral fray showed that even within their 
own ideological camp, anti-democratic argu-
ments were subject to challenge.
On a purely foreign policy basis, the Saudis 
should have found some common ground 
with Muhammad Morsi. While Morsi visited 
Tehran during his presidency, a move that raised 
suspicions in Riyadh, he used the occasion 
to criticize Iranian policy on Syria. He then, 
in effect, called for a jihad against the Assad 
government.39 Yet the Saudis never trusted the 
Brotherhood in power, and enthusiastically 
backed General Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi’s military 
coup in July 2013. 
Riyadh, along with 
its GCC allies the 
UAE and Kuwait, has 
bestowed billions of 
dollars in aid to the 
government installed 
after the coup and 
strenuously defended 
it against criticism from the United States and 
Europe.40
The inability of Turkey and Saudi Arabia to 
form a powerful axis in opposition to Assad in 
Syria and Iranian influence in the region more 
generally can also be attributed, in part, to an 
intra-Sunni Islamist dispute over political order. 
AKP, which has ruled Turkey since 2002, repre-
sents a moderate, electoral Islamism that is very 
close to what at least some elements of the Arab 
Muslim Brotherhood affiliates were seeking to 
become. The AKP government’s sympathies 
with such elements was a stumbling block to 
greater Turkish-Saudi coordination over Syria 
specifically and regional events more generally. 
Differences over the Brotherhood even split 
the diplomatic front of the Gulf monarchs. 
In March 2014, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and 
Bahrain increased pressure on Qatar to reduce 
its support for the Brotherhood by staging a 
37 Abdullah Al-Rashid, “The Brothers and the Emirates,” The Majalla, 14 February 2013, <http://www.majalla.com/eng/2013/02/
article55238281>.
38 Anthony Shadid, “Qatar Wields an Outsize Influence in Arab Politics,” The New York Times, 14 November 2011, <http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/11/15/world/middleeast/qatar-presses-decisive-shift-in-arab-politics.html>; Sultan Sooud Al-Qassemi, “Qatar’s Brotherhood 
Ties Alienate Fellow Gulf States,” Al-Monitor, 23 January 2013, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/01/qatar-muslim-
brotherhood.html>.
39 “Egypt’s Morsi severs ties with Syria, warns of ‘counter-revolution violence’,” Ahram Online, 15 June 2013, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/
News/74082.aspx>.
40 Mohsin Khan and Richard LeBaron, “What Will the Gulf ’s $12 Billion Buy Egypt?” EgyptSource, Atlantic Council, 11 July 2013, 
<http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/egyptsource/what-will-the-gulfs-12-billion-buy-in-egypt>.
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coordinated withdrawal of their ambassadors 
from Doha. Even within the Salafi camp there 
are serious divisions. As mentioned above, 
“democratic salafis” in Egypt and other Arab 
states could eventually present a serious ideo-
logical challenge to the Saudi monarchy. That 
is a challenge for the future. More immediately, 
the Saudi government sees al-Qaeda and its 
regional affiliates as a mortal threat to its own 
domestic rule. The Saudis fought a counterin-
surgency campaign against the local al-Qaeda 
affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP), in the mid-2000s. They succeeded 
in driving what was left of AQAP into Yemen, 
where it remains an element in the chaotic 
Yemeni domestic scene and a latent challenge 
to the Saudis at home. While individual Saudis 
have joined al-Qaeda linked groups in Syria, 
there is no evidence that the Saudi government 
has supported Jabhat al-Nusra or the Islamic 
State, despite their common enemy in the 
Assad regime.
While the severity of the conflict in Syria 
and Iraq has drawn attention to the sectarian 
element of the post-Arab Spring struggles 
for power, these disputes within the Sunni 
world itself are as important for the future of 
the region. Tunisia holds out the possibility 
that democratic Islamists of the Brotherhood 
variety and more secular political forces can 
agree on the rules of a democratic game, but 
the Egyptian experience points in the other 
direction. The chaotic situation in Libya bears 
watching in this regard. The rise of both Islamist 
politics and Salafi jihadi groups dominated the 
Libyan political scene in the immediate post-
Qaddafi period, but the emergence in recent 
months of renegade general Khalifa Haftar, 
vowing to rid Libya of Islamist militias, chal-
lenges that trend. Haftar praises President Sisi 
of Egypt, condemns the Qatari role in Libya, 
and has ordered Turks to leave the country.41 
While there is no concrete evidence of the kind 
of foreign support he is 
receiving, he is certainly 
singing from the Saudi-
UAE-Egyptian bloc’s 
hymnbook. Libya seems to have become a part 
of the intra-Sunni Islamist struggle to define 
what Islam means for politics in the Middle 
East.
41 Mary Fitzgerald, “General Haftar’s Anti-Islamist Campaign Divides Libyans,” BBC, 7 June 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-27715992>; “Renegade General Khalifa Haftar Launches Offensive in East Libya,” Reuters, 15 June 2014, <http://www.voanews.
com/content/reu-renagate-general-launches-offensive-in-east-libya/1937395.html>; Sami Kohen, “Why is Turkey becoming a target in 
Libya?,” Al-Monitor, 26 June 2014, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/06/turkey-target-libya-expulsion-hifter.html>.
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It is axiomatic that as the state recedes in power 
and control non-state actors become more 
important in a country’s domestic politics. 
That has certainly been the case in the new 
Middle East cold war. The Islamic State, 
Hizballah, Jabhat al-Nusra, the Houthis, the 
Sadrists, and more Libyan militias than anyone 
can keep track of now get headlines that were 
once reserved for national governments. The 
spectacular advance of what was then ISIS in 
Iraq in June of 2014, at least temporarily at 
the head of a broader Sunni revolt against the 
Maliki government, highlights the centrality of 
non-state actors. They are often the allies and 
clients of the regional states who are playing the 
new cold war game, but they each have their 
own particular agendas as well. Those agendas 
are deeply embedded in their own domestic 
contexts. Generalizing about them, aside from 
the obvious fact of their growing importance 
as the state weakens, is not possible. A detailed 
analysis of even the most important of the non-
state actors is beyond the scope of this work. 
In the new Middle East cold war, the key to 
success is for a regional power to be able to sup-
port these non-state clients and allies effectively 
in their domestic political battles in the weak 
states of the Arab world. A state’s own military 
power is not a particularly useful tool in this 
game. The clearest evidence of this is the fact 
that the two strongest military powers in the 
region, Israel and Turkey, have not been able 
to play very effectively in the cold war, while 
Qatar, a regional Lilliputian in terms of conven-
tional military power, has. Effective patronage 
of regional allies requires money and guns, 
to be sure, but it also requires transnational 
ideological and political connections that make 
potential clients open to a relationship with 
the patron. Those connections are now more 
important than conventional military strength 
in affecting the course of regional politics.
Israel is an extreme case of a regional military 
powerhouse that lacks those political connec-
tions. It attempted to play into the domestic 
politics of a weak Arab state in Lebanon in the 
1970s and 1980s, using its superior military 
power and its alliance with the Lebanese Forces 
to try to remake the Lebanese state in 1982-
84. That effort was a costly failure and soured 
the Israelis on such ambitious ventures. Even 
their more limited effort to use their military 
superiority to cut Hizballah down to size in 
2006 backfired. Other than the occasional 
missile strike in Syria against convoys headed 
to Lebanon, the Israelis have stayed out of the 
post-Arab Spring struggle for regional influ-
ence. They fear the consequences of regime 
change, not only where they were comfortable 
with the regime, as in Egypt, but also where the 
regime is an opponent, as in Syria. They have 
no natural allies in any of the domestic struggles 
for power. Despite their overwhelming conven-
tional military superiority, they are non-players 
in the new Middle East cold war. The best 
they can do is press the United States to take 
positions that they prefer (in favor of the coup 
government in Egypt, for example).
Turkey is a more complicated case of military 
strength and political weakness. The AKP 
government does have natural allies in many of 
the arenas of the new Middle East cold war, 
most notably Muslim Brotherhood movements 
and the Islamist opposition across the border in 
Syria. It clearly had wanted to play a larger role 
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in the Middle East in the years leading up to 
the Arab Spring. The Turkey of the 2000s por-
trayed an effective model of democracy, mod-
erate Islamist politics, and economic success to 
a region that lacked all three. Foreign Minister 
Ahmet Davutoglu’s policy of “no problems 
with neighbors” had eased historic strains with 
the Arab world and with Iran. Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s very public criticism of 
Israel gained him fans across the Arab world. 
For those who saw “soft power” as the new 
means for increasing a country’s international 
influence, Turkey looked like an excellent case 
study.
The Arab uprisings of 2011 upended some of 
the premises of the AKP government’s outreach 
in the Middle East. Turkey initially expressed 
opposition to the NATO operation in Libya,42 
but Erdogan pivoted quickly, coming around to 
back the revolt against Qaddafi. In September 
2011 he took a “victory lap,” visiting Egypt, 
Libya, and Tunisia to tout the Turkish model 
for political development.43 The electoral vic-
tories of Ennahda in Tunisia and the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt 
seemed to herald the 
possibility of a “demo-
cratic Islamist bloc” 
emerging in the Middle 
East with Turkey in a 
leadership role. Soft 
power seemed triumphant.
Nowhere did the Arab Spring discombobulate 
Turkish foreign policy more than in Syria. The 
AKP government had gone out of its way to 
smooth Turkey’s historically tense relations 
with Damascus. The two capitals dropped 
barriers to their citizens crossing the border 
and encouraged business investment. Erdogan 
developed a personal relationship with Bashar 
al-Assad, meeting him numerous times amidst 
media portrayals of a close friendship between 
the leaders.
Despite the warming of Turkey’s relations 
with the Ba‘athist government, Ankara quickly 
demonstrated its sympathies with the Syrian 
protesters. Foreign Minister Davutoglu vis-
ited Damascus in August 2011 and publicly 
urged Assad to undertake political reform. In 
November 2011, Erdogan became one of the 
first world leaders to call for Assad to step down 
in the face of the Syrian protests.44 Even earlier, 
Ankara had begun to support Assad’s oppo-
nents by allowing the Syrian National Council, 
the original body of exiled Syrian opposition 
politicians, to operate out of Istanbul. The 
Free Syrian Army and other armed opposition 
groups used Turkish territory for bases amid 
evidence that the Turkish government was 
providing support to Islamist factions of the 
opposition.45 As of early 2014, Turkey has also 
hosted over 600,000 Syrian refugees.46 
By 2013, however, Turkey’s enthusiasm 
for involvement in the Syrian civil war was 
beginning to wane. The 2011 hopes that the 
Syrian regime would fall relatively quickly, as 
others had that year, had faded. The refugee 
burden was growing, with no end in sight. 
The emerging strength of more extreme Sunni 
jihadi elements in the armed opposition threat-
ened to bring al-Qaeda-linked groups and 
their violence into Turkey itself. Meanwhile, 
42 “Erdogan’s Lament,” The Economist, 7 April 2011, <http://www.economist.com/node/18530682>.
43 Steven A. Cook, “Erdogan’s Middle East Victory Lap,” Foreign Affairs, 15 September 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68269/
steven-a-cook/erdogans-middle-eastern-victory-lap>.
44 Sebnem Arsu, “Turkish Premier Urges Assad to Quit in Syria,” The New York Times, 22 November 2011, <http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/11/23/world/middleeast/turkish-leader-says-syrian-president-should-quit.html>.
45 Bayram Balci, “Turkey’s Relations with the Syrian Opposition,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 13 April 2012, <http://
carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/13/turkey-s-relations-with-syrian-opposition/a88u#>. Regan Doherty and Amena Bakr, “Exclusive: 
Secret Turkish nerve center leads aid to Syria rebels,” Reuters, 27 July 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/27/us-syria-crisis-
centre-idUSBRE86Q0JM20120727>.
46 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Syrian regional refugee response,” 19 February 2014, <https://data.unhcr.org/
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the summer 2013 demonstrations against the 
Erdogan government in Istanbul and other 
cities and the political rift between the prime 
minister and the Gulen movement refocused 
the AKP’s attention on domestic problems. By 
the end of 2013, there were numerous signals 
that Ankara’s focus had shifted, at least partially, 
from removing Assad to limiting the political 
effects of the Syrian civil war on Turkey itself.47 
While Erdogan has publicly, on a number of 
occasions, called for international military 
intervention in Syria, he has been unwilling to 
use the powerful Turkish army unilaterally in 
the conflict. Turkish public opinion is clearly 
against military involvement. The military 
itself, though cowed by Erdogan’s successful 
political campaign against its political role in 
the 2000s, is hesitant to take the fight into 
Syria.48 It is hard not to draw the conclusion 
that Turkey’s efforts to direct the politics of 
Syria have failed. When it comes to civil wars, 
the AKP government has learned the hard way 
that soft power is not very useful.
Qatar, on the other hand, though it is a state with 
a miniscule population and no military power 
to speak of, has had an outsized influence on 
the new Middle East cold war. That influence is 
based in part on Doha’s enormous wealth, but 
two other elements to the Qatari strategy have 
given the tiny country regional clout. The first 
is an information strategy, through its sponsor-
ship of Al Jazeera. The Qatari leadership was 
smart enough to know that it had to allow the 
station a wide range of editorial independence 
in order for it to earn the credibility necessary 
to gain a widespread regional audience.49 Al 
Jazeera did just that, and when the Arab upris-
ings began, it became the primary medium 
through which the 
momentous events 
of 2011 were 
conveyed to the 
Arab world (and, 
to some extent, 
beyond). As a result, the Qataris were able to 
influence regional and global perceptions of 
events with blanket coverage of the situation in 
Egypt, sympathetic portrayals of the opposition 
in Libya and Syria, and very little coverage of 
the uprising in fellow GCC monarchy Bahrain.
The second element of the Qatari influence 
strategy was to pick a side—that of Sunni 
Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Al Jazeera had long broadcast the popular 
“Sharia and Life” program of Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood thinker Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who 
made Qatar his residence in exile. With the 
uprisings of 2011, Qatar intervened more 
directly in support of Islamist elements in Libya 
and Syria.50 The then-emir, Sheikh Hamad bin 
Khalifa Al Thani, paid a state visit to Hamas-
controlled Gaza in October 2012, bringing 
hundreds of millions of dollars in aid.51 Qatar 
was the largest source of financial aid for the 
Muslim Brotherhood-led government in post-
Mubarak Egypt.52
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While the Brotherhood and similar groups 
were doing well, the Qatari strategy paid 
dividends. Sustaining such a prominent role 
in regional politics was difficult for a small 
country like Qatar, despite its vast wealth and 
the ambition of its former emir. Its close ties 
to the Muslim Brotherhood set it against Saudi 
Arabia and other GCC partners, culminating 
in the aforementioned March 2014 spat. Its 
prominent role in Libya and Syria led to local 
backlashes against it. The United States, its 
ultimate security guarantor, pressed it to rein 
in its support for Syrian Islamists.53 The coup 
against the Muslim Brotherhood government 
in Egypt in July 2013 demonstrated the tenu-
ousness of Qatari geopolitical gains. With the 
abdication of Sheikh Hamad as emir in June 
2013, the ascension of his son Tamim as the 
new emir and the retirement from public life of 
Sheikh Hamad’s main partner in Qatar’s ambi-
tious global strategy, former Prime Minister 
Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani, it appears 
that Qatar is scaling down its regional strategy, 
though it is difficult to determine just what 
foreign policy line the new emir will settle 
upon.54 While the costs of failure in the new 
Middle East cold war are substantial, the costs 
of success are not inconsiderable.
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Complaints about the inconsistency of current 
American policy in the Middle East are almost 
as common as complaints about its passivity.55 
The United States is trying to limit Iranian 
influence in Syria, but negotiating with Iran on 
nuclear weapons. It is backing the Iranian-allied 
government in Iraq against a Sunni Muslim 
insurgency in which Islamists play a large role, 
but opposing the Iranian-allied government in 
Syria and supporting a Sunni Muslim insur-
gency in which Islamists play a large role. It 
calls for the downfall of the Assad regime but 
backs away from the use of force against it, 
and then becomes, indirectly, its partner in an 
agreement to rid Syria of its chemical weapons. 
It argues for democracy in Egypt but refuses to 
call the military coup there by its name. One 
can multiply this list further.
That inconsistency should not surprise. The 
United States does not view the region through 
the lens of the new Middle East cold war. 
While it is concerned about the regional bal-
ance of power, its interests are not as directly 
tied up with every twist and turn of the contest 
for influence between Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
To state it flatly, who rules Syria is not as 
important to Washington as it is to Riyadh and 
to Tehran. The Obama Administration has an 
array of goals in the Middle East that cross over 
the lines of the new Middle East cold war, and 
it seems perfectly comfortable with that.
A nuclear deal with Iran is clearly one of the 
Administration’s top priorities. It will not 
allow Iranian behavior in Syria, Lebanon, or 
Iraq to stand in the way of securing that deal, 
if the P5+1 negotiating process produces one. 
That does not mean, however, as some in 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states think, that 
Washington is willing to concede the Middle 
East as an Iranian sphere of influence in order 
to get that deal.56 One can hardly imagine a 
United States so closely aligned with Israel 
agreeing to accept a dominant Iranian regional 
role. On the contrary, the Administration sees a 
nuclear deal as part of a longer-term strategy to 
limit Iranian regional influence and reintegrate 
a more moderate Iran into the global political 
economy. It has taken numerous steps, including 
the President’s own visit to Riyadh in March 
2014, to reassure the Saudis that a nuclear 
deal with Tehran does not mean a geopolitical 
“grand bargain” confirming Iranian regional 
dominance. Washington is pursuing negotia-
tions with Iran on nuclear issues while pressing 
Iraq to avoid further integration into Tehran’s 
sphere of influence, supporting (somewhat) 
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the Syrian opposition, and arming the Gulf 
states.57 Though negotiating with the Iranians 
on nuclear issues while opposing their regional 
influence might seem “inconsistent” to some, 
it simply reflects the Administration’s longer-
term view of American regional interests.
Likewise, the Administration sees any resurgence 
of al-Qaeda and its affiliates in the region as a 
serious threat, for understandable reasons. Its 
drone policy in Yemen and Pakistan is evidence 
enough of how seriously it views this threat. Its 
immediate support for the Maliki government 
in Iraq in the face of ISIS gains in June 2014 
demonstrated the primacy of the Salafi jihadi 
threat in its regional priorities. It is therefore 
not surprising that the Administration is more 
cautious than Saudi Arabia in its dealings with 
a Syrian opposition in which an al-Qaeda 
affiliate (Jabhat al-Nusra), a group even al-
Qaeda disavowed (the Islamic State), and other 
al-Qaeda-friendly Salafi groups are playing 
important roles. Saudi Arabia is simply more 
comfortable with long-bearded Sunni Muslim 
fighters than is the United States, though it 
too increasingly realizes the dangerous political 
consequences of the fighting in Syria and Iraq 
for its own domestic security. 
Washington would like to see Assad gone from 
power, as it regularly states, but it is not willing to 
subordinate its interest in preventing the regional 
resurgence of al-Qaeda to that goal. It would like to 
see Iranian influence in Iraq reduced, but not if the 
price is an increased role for Salafi jihadis like those 
of the Islamic State. What others see as inconsis-
tency is, for the Obama Administration, simply 
balancing its regional interests. This balancing act 
not only involves America’s regional interests, but 
also the Administration’s broader political interest 
in avoiding American involvement in another 
Middle Eastern war. All this might add up to an 
“inconsistent” foreign policy toward the new 
Middle East cold war, but it is an inconsistency 
based on the Administration’s reading of America’s 
complicated regional interests.
The longer-term challenge of the new Middle 
East cold war is as daunting as it is simple: 
building states that can effectively govern 
their societies. Effective governance in Iraq, 
Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, and Libya 
would drastically reduce the opportunities for 
regional powers to meddle across their borders 
and thus limit the scope of regional balance of 
power struggles. Sub-state actors in effectively 
governed states will have less reason to seek out 
foreign patrons, and, if they do, an effective 
state will prevent them from establishing such 
ties. Effectively governed states do not become 
havens for transnational terrorist groups like 
al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Building effective 
governance that is basically democratic and 
respectful of citizens’ human and civil rights is 
an even more daunting task. That kind of gov-
ernance is the most stable and effective in the 
long-term, no doubt, but there is no consensus 
about how a state reaches that sweet spot of 
stable and decent government. The road to that 
point is not only bumpy, it is foggy.
The United States demonstrated in Iraq that it 
is much better at state-destroying than state-
building. With limited resources and even 
more limited political will, Washington is not 
going to play a major role in the reconstruction 
of effective political authority in Arab states. 
That is for the best. America has no better map 
for that bumpy and foggy road than anyone 
else. With that appropriate sense of modesty, 
Washington can safeguard its interests by fol-
lowing a number of relatively simple rules:
1) Remember that the new Middle East cold 
war is not America’s war. While the United 
States has core interests to protect in the 
Middle East, as of yet the new cold war has 
not directly threatened those interests. Oil con-
tinues to flow from the Gulf region. As difficult 
as the refugee spillover from Syria has been for 
American allies in Turkey and Jordan, it has 
not destabilized those countries, even as it has 
encouraged the upsurge in violence in Iraq. 
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Israel is certainly affected by the events in Syria 
and Lebanon, but it is not directly threatened 
by them. Al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and its ideo-
logical counterparts like the Islamic State have 
gained from the chaos in Syria, Iraq, Libya, 
and Yemen, but those gains are limited and its 
affiliates are consumed with the local fighting 
to this point. Certainly many good things 
would flow from an end to the Syrian fighting, 
like lessening the threat of political instability 
in Lebanon, but Lebanese political stability is 
hardly a sufficient reason to justify an increased 
American military role in Syria. It is just not 
that important for American interests. 
The Middle East is a multi-polar region, with 
a number of important regional powers acting 
in its politics: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel, 
and Egypt. If one of them seems to be emerging 
as a dominant force, the others will naturally 
work to balance against it and limit the growth 
of its power.58 That is what happened to Gamal 
Abd al-Nasir in the 1960s and what happened 
to revolutionary Iran in the 1980s. In each of 
these cases the United States aided the states 
who were balancing against the prospective 
regional hegemon, but also kept some distance. 
Washington can confidently avoid direct mili-
tary involvement in the new Middle East cold 
war by following a similar strategy and relying 
on regional balance of power dynamics to block 
Iranian hegemony. It is highly unlikely that the 
Iranians will turn the new Middle East cold 
war hot by using their military power to try 
to alter the regional map, as Saddam Hussein 
did with his invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Even 
if they do, other regional powers will welcome 
and cooperate with a similar American military 
intervention to restore the status-quo. Those bal-
ancing dynamics go double for non-state actors 
like the Islamic State, which has no regional 
friends at all. To the extent that the Islamic State 
can consolidate its gains in Iraq, which is not 
assured, it will see not only Iran but also Turkey 
and Saudi Arabia start to work against it.
2) Order is better than chaos, so support the 
states that have continued to provide effective 
governance, even if that governance does not 
achieve the preferred levels of democracy and 
human rights. That means all sorts of things 
that run against many of the talking points one 
frequently hears in Washington:
▪▪ It means exploring every avenue to a new 
relationship with the Rouhani government 
in Iran, despite our opposition to Iranian 
policy in various parts of the Middle East. 
This is a difficult and frustrating task, 
because Rouhani does not control all the 
levers of power in Tehran. He will not be 
able to do everything the United States 
would like. It will require patience in Wash-
ington and a willingness to tolerate setbacks. 
Nevertheless, the success of Rouhani and his 
allies against their domestic opponents is 
the best long-term hope for a more normal 
Iranian-American relationship and a less 
disruptive Iranian regional role. America’s 
ability to affect the course of domestic 
political struggles in Iran is very limited, to 
be sure. Still, reaching a mutually acceptable 
agreement on the Iranian nuclear question 
that satisfies the P5+1 goal of moving Iran 
back from nuclear breakout capability while 
allowing Rouhani to claim a victory through 
sanctions reduction and the re-integration 
of Iran into the world economy would 
certainly strengthen his position in internal 
Iranian politics.
▪▪ Order and chaos are now in a delicate bal-
ance in Iraq due to the gains of the Islamic 
State and the broader but fractious Sunni 
revolt. It would be ideal if Washington 
could leverage the threat of the revolt to 
push Prime Minister Maliki to broaden 
his government and change his autocratic 
style, bringing credible Sunni Arab leaders 
into the government and giving them the 
resources to combat Salafi jihadism and the 
58 L. Carl Brown, International Politics of the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Stephen 
M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
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remnants of the Saddam Hussein govern-
ment in their territories. That ideal result 
is unlikely, however, given Maliki’s obvious 
deficiencies, the role of Iran in Iraqi politics, 
and the poverty of leadership in the Iraqi 
political class generally. The more imme-
diate task is to make sure that the Islamic 
State is defeated on the battlefield. To the 
extent that its momentum is turned back, 
its allies in the Sunni community will begin 
to distance themselves from the group. At 
that point, but not before, it would make 
sense for the United States to use whatever 
clout it still has in Iraq to press for a more 
inclusive government. In the meantime, 
Washington should be engaged with all the 
regional powers, including Iran, to prepare 
for coordinated pressure on all Iraqi parties 
to form a more inclusive and effective gov-
ernment after the the Islamic State threat 
has been turned back. The message from the 
United States and from the relevant regional 
players to Iraq’s Sunni Arabs should be, “all 
things are possible if the Islamic State is 
defeated; nothing is possible as long as the 
Islamic State is ascendant.”
▪▪ Egypt does not face the daunting problems 
of Iraq, but it is not going in the right 
direction. Still, the United States should 
continue to engage with the military gov-
ernment in Egypt, while rejecting President 
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s transparent efforts 
to stoke anti-American feeling in Egypt 
to strengthen his domestic position. The 
United States should deal with him straight if 
he reciprocates and if he continues to follow 
a foreign policy that maintains cooperation 
with the United States and peace with Israel. 
Washington can express its preferences for 
greater democratic and liberal reforms in 
Egypt, but it has to deal with the Egyptian 
government as it is. 
Preferring order to chaos also means con-
tinuing policies that are not controversial in 
Washington, but remain very important:
▪▪ Jordan is an island of stability and decent 
governance in the Arab East, even as it 
fails to achieve hoped-for standards of 
democracy. It is under severe pressure from 
the Syrian refugee crisis. It deserves all the 
support the United States can offer. 
▪▪ Despite tensions with Saudi Arabia on 
a range of regional issues, the bilateral 
Saudi-American relationship is an ele-
ment of regional stability and deserves to 
be nurtured, as difficult as reassurance of 
Riyadh can sometimes be. Where the two 
countries have a common understanding 
of their interests, there is enormous mutual 
benefit from cooperation. Where they are 
not on the same page, as on dealing with 
Iran, Washington should not be overly wor-
ried about Saudi complaints. Saudi Arabia 
needs its American security connection all 
the more as regional instability continues.
▪▪ There is no particular pressure, either in 
Washington or in the Gulf states, for a 
reduction in the American military role 
there. Given regional uncertainties and 
the exaggerated fears of some in the Gulf 
of American abandonment, there is every 
reason to sustain the current American 
military infrastructure in Kuwait, Qatar, the 
UAE, and Oman. 
▪▪ Bahrain is the most difficult case among 
the Gulf states in which the United States 
has military facilities, given the continued 
political unrest on the island, but there is 
no short-term incentive for an American 
military withdrawal from Bahrain at this 
time. It is better to stay engaged and keep 
encouraging those elements of the ruling 
family who are working for some kind of 
political reconciliation, while realizing that 
a full reconciliation will probably require an 
improvement in Saudi-Iranian relations.
▪▪ There is not much the United States can effec-
tively do to affect the current political crisis in 
Turkey, but sustaining good bilateral relations 
makes both geopolitical and economic sense.
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3) An improvement in Saudi-Iranian relations 
would greatly enhance the chances for political 
settlements in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and 
Bahrain and would lessen the poisonous sec-
tarianism that so dominates the region’s politics 
now. It would certainly be in the United States’ 
interest to see such an improvement. Despite 
the intense hostility between the two countries, 
it is not impossible to imagine a situation in 
which both sides would see it in their interests 
to work toward more normal relations. There 
are certainly serious obstacles to such a rap-
prochement, but Riyadh and Tehran have had 
a much more civil and less contentious relation-
ship even as recently as the mid-2000s.59 Yet it 
would be counter-productive for the United 
States to push the Saudis toward Iran. There is 
already considerable suspicion in Riyadh that 
the United States has cut a geopolitical deal 
with Iran, and an American effort to encourage 
the Saudis to come to terms with Iran would 
be seen as part of that deal and undoubtedly 
resisted. Better to let the Saudis decide for 
themselves when and how to try to address 
their differences with Iran. There are plenty of 
incentives for them to do so, if the Iranians are 
willing to respond in kind.
4) Multilateral is more effective than unilateral, 
if feasible. Sanctions on Iran really began to bite 
when countries other than the United States 
joined in, and negotiations with Iran required 
the cover of the P5 + 1 to gain any momentum. 
That momentum has led to tentative bilateral 
contacts between Tehran and Washington, 
but it is hard to imagine how that would have 
happened without both multi-lateral initia-
tives. Multilateral approaches will also be more 
effective in cutting the Islamic State down to 
size in Iraq. Any diplomatic effort to staunch 
the violence in Syria will likewise have to be 
multilateral, as frustrating as that process has 
been. While the Geneva process on Syria has 
not yielded any progress on the political level, it 
is useful to have a process in place in case there 
are changes in the correlation of forces, either 
on the ground in Syria or in Russia’s attitude 
toward the conflict. If the nuclear negotiations 
with Iran succeed, it would make sense to con-
sider including Iran in the Geneva framework, 
if Tehran would be willing to induce their 
client Hizballah to reduce its involvement in 
the conflict. 
Likewise, multilateral approaches with the 
EU will be more effective at bolstering North 
Africa’s (relative) success stories like Morocco, 
supporting the important but still fragile 
transition in Tunisia, pushing Algeria toward 
a more inclusive political system and aiding, 
to the extent possible, the building of state 
institutions in Libya. For all the North African 
countries, economic relations with Europe 
are far more important than those with the 
United States. Any commitment of diplomatic 
or financial resources there will be much more 
effective if combined with European partners 
whose interests in North Africa are greater than 
America’s.
These policies, taken together, are certainly 
“inconsistent” when viewed through the lens 
of the new Middle East cold war. In some 
instances they support the “pro-Iranian” side, 
in others, the “pro-Saudi” side. The United 
States should not define its interests this way. It 
needs to focus on core interests of securing oil 
production and oil flows, combatting terrorist 
groups that target the United States and its 
allies, and preventing the spill-over of regional 
violence into the politics of stable American 
allies. Concentrating American policy on the 
states that actually govern, acting multilater-
ally both to pressure foes and support friends, 
and remembering that U.S. interests are not as 
directly engaged in the new Middle East cold 
war as those of the local parties are the keys to 
riding out this particular violent and difficult 
period in the region.
59 F. Gregory Gause, III, “Saudi-Iranian Rapprochement? The Incentives and the Obstacles,” in “Visions of Gulf Security,” POMEPS Studies 
no. 25, Project on Middle East Political Science, 25 March 2014, <pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Visions_of_Gulf_Security.
pdf>, 7-9.
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